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Abstract
In this paper we propose a tick time model for the quote setting process on
Nasdaq using a time series of all quote updates by the most active dealers and
ECN’s (Electronic Communication Networks). The model includes duration
effects in the volatility of the efficient price and in the covariance of quote
updates with the efficient price. As a measure of price discovery we define
information shares in tick time. When aggregated to calendar time they provide
an alternative for the Hasbrouck (1995) information shares.
In the empirical analysis we compare quotes from two ECN”s (Island and
Instinet), and three wholesale market makers for 20 actively traded stocks with
varying liquidity. We find that volatility does not increase with the duration
between quote updates, and that longer quote durations lead to lower price
discovery. In terms of price discovery we find that ECNs tend to dominate the
liquid stocks, whereas market makers are important for less liquid stocks.
Keywords: Price Discovery, Tick Time models, Nasdaq, Ultra-high frequency
data, Microstructure.
JEL Classifications: C32, G15.
1 Introduction
Price discovery is the process of how different information sources contribute to the
evolution of the underlying value of an asset. In a fragmented market with multi-
ple dealers, like the Nasdaq, each dealer contributes to the price discovery process.
Interesting questions are which dealer contributes most, how quick the discovery pro-
cess works, and how it depends on market circumstances like liquidity, volatility and
trading intensity.
An important measure for the price discovery contribution is the information share
defined by Hasbrouck (1995). Hasbrouck (1995) defines information shares as the
part of the variance of the random walk component of returns that can be attributed
to a particular market or dealer. Unfortunately this variance decomposition is not
unique when innovations to returns are contemporaneously correlated. Hasbrouck
(1995) suggests alternative Choleski decompositions to establish upper and lower
bounds. This works well in many cases when the number of different markets or
market participants is small and the differences among them are large enough.
The intervals between upper and lower bounds can be very wide, however, if
we wish to discriminate between more than two (groups of) participants. A typical
application, and the one we will revisit in this paper, is the question on how informa-
tive different ECNs (Electronic Communication Networks) are for the price discovery
process on Nasdaq. Huang (2002) applies the Hasbrouck (1995) methodology to a
variety of stocks to study the relationship between ECN’s and traditional dealers. He
estimates a vector error correction model for quotes issued by five different groups
of market participants sampled at one minute intervals. For some stocks the infor-
mation share of an important ECN like Island can range between 25 and 85 percent
depending on the order of the variance decomposition. In this case the information
share measure does not seem to be an informative statistical measure.
Baillie, Booth, Tse, and Zabotina (2002) show that upper and lower bounds can
differ substantially, when the contemporaneous correlation between innovations is
high, even if returns are observed at one minute intervals. Since the contemporaneous
correlation becomes smaller the higher the sampling frequency, tick time data would
be the preferred observation frequency. The use of tick time data for estimating price
discovery among Nasdaq dealers is the main topic of this paper.
In developing information shares based on a tick time model we deviate from
Hasbrouck (1995) in three ways. First, we use a different model for the dynamics of
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quote changes. In the traditional vector autoregression of Hasbrouck (1995) the vector
of quotes changes will contain many zeros in tick time, since for most observations
only a single dealer will refresh his quote. For a multivariate time series analysis some
time aggregation will be required to construct a vector of non-zero quote updates for
all dealers for every time interval. An unobserved components specification is more
suitable for ultra-high frequency data, since it does not require a complete vector of
dealer quotes in each time interval. The model we propose is an extension of the
structural time series model of Hasbrouck (1993) to a setting with multiple dealers
where quotes arrive in tick time.
Second, we allow for duration effects on the quote dynamics. Time is an important
factor in microstructure (Engle and Patton, 2004). It affects the volatility of the
efficient price (Engle, 2000) and also has an impact on the information content of
dealer quote updates (Dufour and Engle, 2000). Both effects will be included in the
model.
Third, we slightly change the definition of information shares. Our definition fol-
lows the calendar time measures proposed by De Jong and Schotman (2004) for an
unobserved components model. It exploits the structural interpretation of the unob-
served components model, in contrast to the reduced form expressions in Hasbrouck
(1995). We first define price discovery measures in tick time, where they are a func-
tion of the time between quote innovations. Additionally, we integrate these measures
over time to obtain their calendar time equivalents. The aggregated calendar time
information shares are closely related to the Hasbrouck (1995) information shares.
In our empirical part we examine the quotes of two ECN’s (Island and Instinet)
and three wholesale market makers at Nasdaq for 20 actively traded stocks with
varying liquidity. These market makers are selected as the most active in terms of
quoting frequency. For a tick time model it is more natural to consider the quote
setting behavior of individual dealers instead of classes of dealers as in Huang (2002).
Considering individual dealers is also in line with Schultz (2003) who finds a lot of
heterogeneity among individual market makers.
As a preview of the results, we find that volatility does not evolve in calendar
time, but in tick time as predicted by Clark (1973). The information flow to the
efficient price is in general less at longer durations. We confirm the hypothesis of
Easley and O’Hara (1992), which states that long durations convey no information.
Similar results were found by Dufour and Engle (2000), and Engle and Patton (2004).
Price discovery measures in tick time appear strongly dependent on durations.
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Some dealers reveal information when durations are short whereas others reveal in-
formation when durations are long. Aggregating to calendar time we can often clearly
identify the dominant dealer. In terms of price discovery we find that Island, the most
important of the ECNs, tends to dominate the liquid stocks, whereas market makers
dominate the less liquid stocks.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses specifica-
tion and estimation of the model. Section 3 defines the measures for price discovery in
tick time and derives the calendar time aggregation of these measures. In section 4 we
discuss the data. Section 5 presents the results of the model and the price discovery
measures. Finally section 6 concludes and provides suggestions for further research.
2 A Model for Quotes in Tick Time
In this section we introduce a structural time series model for quote data in tick
time. The model is an extension of the unobserved components model of Hasbrouck
(1993) and theoretically motivated by the asymmetric information model of Glosten
and Harris (1988).
p
tt1 t2 t3
a2
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b1
b2
Figure 1: Quote Arrivals
The figure shows bid and ask quotes for two dealers. Bid quotes are
denoted b1 and b2; ask quotes a1 and a2, respectively.
We consider a dealer market where M dealers issue bid and ask quotes. Quotes
arrive at times t` (` = 1, . . . , L). Figure 1 illustrates the quote arrival process. At t1
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dealer 1 increases her bid and ask quote simultaneously. Next, at t2, dealer 2 increases
only her ask. At time t3 both dealers change one of their quotes. When sampling
in tick time we are interested in all quotes that are updated. These can be updates
in bid and/or ask quotes of one or more dealers. The time between two consecutive
quote arrivals is the duration τ` = t` − t`−1. We will specify the dynamics of quote
updates conditional on durations.
With M dealers in the market we have 2M different time series of quotes. Let q`
be the (2M × 1) vector of all standing quotes at time t`. The bid (ask) of dealer i
corresponds to element 2i− 1 (2i) of q`.
Our interest is in modeling the dynamics of quote updates. We define the (k`×2M)
selection matrix J`, containing the rows of the identity matrix that correspond the
elements of q` that are updated at time t`. The selection matrices at times t1, t2 and
t3 in figure 1 would be
J1 =
(
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
)
, J2 =
(
0 0 0 1
)
, J3 =
(
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
)
The vector of updated quotes is J`q`. We assume the time series of updated quotes
can be described by an unobserved components model,
J`q` = J` (c+ ιm` + u`) , (1)
where m` is the permanent component of the price, which is common to all dealers
and will be referred to as the “true” or efficient price of the asset; ι is the 2M -vector
of ones; c is an 2M -vector of constants; and u` is a 2M -vector of temporary deviations
from m`.
The permanent component is assumed to follow a random walk,
m` = m`−1 + σ` r`, (2)
with duration dependent volatility (σ`) and with an innovation term (r`) with unit
variance. By allowing for volatility to depend on duration we can test for the time
scale in which the price process evolves. Clark (1973) argues that the relevant time
scale for the price process is the rate at which information arrives to the market. He
measures this arrival rate by the amount of volume that is transacted. Harris (1987)
and Ane´ and Geman (2000) show that it is not so much volume that drives the price
process but the arrival of orders. We specify volatility as a function of duration,
σ` = στ
δ1
` , (3)
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The parameter δ1 measures the impact of quote durations on the volatility of the
random walk. If δ1 =
1
2 the random walk is said to evolve in calendar time. In this
case the variance of (mp − ms) is equal to (
∑p
`=s+1 τ`)σ
2, and thus proportional to
the length of the calendar time interval.1 When δ1 = 0, the variance of the random
walk is not affected by the time between quote updates. In this case the random walk
evolves in tick time. In this case the calendar time variance is proportional to the
number of quote updates.
The constants c measure the average spread between a bid- or ask-quote and the
efficient price. This term captures e.g. the order processing costs of the market maker.
To reduce the number of parameters we assume that bid and ask deviations from the
efficient price are symmetric, meaning that the elements in the constant c are of the
same magnitude (negative for bid, positive for ask).
The last term in (1) is the transitory component u`, which is related to infor-
mational asymmetries among dealers about the true price, dealer specific inventory
costs and other sources of microstructure noise such as price discreteness. Glosten
and Harris (1988) argue that the prices of informed market participants are correlated
with the innovation in the efficient price. The model of Glosten and Harris (1988) ex-
plains the dynamics of transaction prices, whereas our model is formulated for quote
updates. Since we only look at those quotes that are updated at time t`, the quote
series J`q` are information events like transactions prices. We therefore split u` in two
components,
u` = α`r` + e`, (4)
where the 2M -vector α` measures the asymmetric information, and e` is idiosyncratic
noise. As for the evolution of the efficient price, we allow this information component
to depend on the time between quote innovations,
α` = ατ
δ2
` σ, (5)
where α is a 2M -vector of parameters. The parameter δ2 controls the impact of
duration on the asymmetric information. If δ2 < 0, quotes become less informative
at longer durations. This would be consistent with Easley and O’Hara (1992) who
hypothesize that long durations convey no information. Dufour and Engle (2000)
1 In the empirical model duration is normalized by dividing it by the average quote duration over
the whole sample. This normalization only affects the σ parameter, which now refers to the volatility
per tick, instead of the volatility per second. It facilitates interpretation of σ across different stocks.
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and Engle and Patton (2004) find that the price impact of trades is largest at short
durations.
Although durations between quote innovations of a particular dealer will be inter-
esting as well, our primary interest here is on the duration between any quotes. This
provides a measure for the speed of the market and we can test whether asymmetric
information is larger during active periods or less active periods. In this sense we
also capture part of the intradaily differences between open, mid-day and close, as
durations tend to be smaller near the open and close and larger in the mid-day.
The idiosyncratic quote noise e` is uncorrelated with r` and τ` and has covariance
matrix Ω. We assume that Ω has a block diagonal structure,
Ω =

Ω1
. . .
ΩM
 , (6)
where each Ωi is a (2× 2) matrix. The idiosyncratic bid and ask quotes of the same
dealer are correlated, but not correlated with innovations in other dealer quote up-
dates. Dealer specific noise includes inventory effects and a remaining microstructure
noise. Theoretical models for inventory costs adhere to the notion that when a dealer
receives inventory she will lower her ask to induce a trade at the opposite side, but
also lowers her bid to avoid receiving additional inventory. Therefore, a specific dealer
may wish to alter both quotes simultaneously due to the inventory position she has.
Simultaneous changes in the quotes of different dealers can be due to asymmetric
information both dealers have, which is captured by α.
A second reason for assuming the block diagonal structure is related to identifi-
cation. To identify covariances between idiosyncratic noise of two different dealers,
we would need to observe simultaneous quote updates of these two dealers. Since
most quote updates J` contain changes of the quotes of a single dealer, only a small
fraction of the data would be available for estimation of the off-diagonal blocks of Ω.
With the block diagonal structure for Ω no other restrictions are necessary for the
full identification of all parameters. The only problematical case would be when both
duration parameters δ1 and δ2 would be equal to zero, and at the same time all quote
updates would be by a single dealer. Appendix 6 discusses the identification in more
detail.
To estimate the model we put it in state space form for a time series process with
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missing observations. Following Harvey (1989) we write
J`q` = J` (c+ ιm` + u`) ,
m` = m`−1 + σ`r`,
u` = ατ
δ2
` σr` + e`,
(7)
Estimation of (7) is done by Maximum Likelihood using the Kalman Filter. As the
underlying process is a random walk, the system cannot be initialized using the long
run mean of the underlying process. We use a diffuse prior to initialize the random
walk process and exclude the first 50 observations in the calculation of the likelihood
function. To incorporate the potentially large price change overnight the model is
re-initialized everyday with a diffuse prior. However, the parameters are estimated
over the whole sample period.
As the model considers quote updates, the dimension of the quote vector will fre-
quently be one. This makes computations in the Kalman Filter recursions straight-
forward and numerically fast for most observations. However since this dimension
changes over time the model will not converge to a steady state and the full recursion
will have to be computed for each observation. For this reason the optimization of
the likelihood is computationally intensive.
3 Price Discovery
In this section we define price discovery measures in tick time using the unobserved
components model of the previous section. These tick time measures are subsequently
aggregated to calendar time equivalents.
3.1 Price Discovery in Tick time
We consider three measures to summarize the quote setting behavior of dealers. The
first measure considers how dealers incorporate information in the efficient price into
their quote innovations. The second measure considers the contribution of quote
innovations of each dealer to the evolution of the efficient price. The last measure
combines the two to obtain the information share of each dealer analogously to Has-
brouck (1995).
To explore the implications of the model we consider the following scenario. Sup-
pose at t` each dealer issues bid and ask quotes and that the previous efficient price
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m`−1 is known to all dealers. Quote updates reflect both the change in efficient price,
m` −m`−1 and the dealer noise e`. Substituting (2) and (4) in (1) the innovation of
the dealer quotes is equal to
v` = q` − E[q`|m`−1, q`−1]
= (ισ` + α`) r` + e`
=
(
ι+
α`
σ`
)
(m` −m`−1) + e`
(8)
From the decomposition (8) we obtain the first measure of the price discovery process.
The duration dependent regression coefficient,
β` = ι+
α`
σ`
, (9)
shows how much of the change in the efficient price is immediately reflected in the
quote update. As this measure refers to dealer efficiency and reveals how transparent
the efficient price process is to a particular dealer, we refer to this measure as dealer
liquidity. The more of the innovation in the random walk that is incorporated in
dealer quotes, the more liquid they are. Using (5) and (3) for the dependence of α`
and σ` on duration τ` we find
β(τ) = ι+ ατ (δ2−δ1), (10)
as the 2M -vector measuring dealer liquidity. It is a function of the duration between
quote innovations with crucial parameters α, δ1 and δ2. At long durations this measure
will converge to ι when δ1 > δ2. This is theoretically the most likely case, since we
expect 0 < δ1 <
1
2 and δ2 < 0. The sign of α determines whether 1 is an upper or
a lower bound for the respective element in β(τ). When α is larger than zero, β(τ)
will be larger than one. This indicates that this quote incorporates more information
of the random walk and vice versa. Hence, whether a dealer is more or less efficient
depends solely on the sign of α.
For the second measure we consider the reverse regression, relating the change
in the efficient price to innovations in dealer quotes similar to Hasbrouck’s (1995)
analysis of price discovery,
∆m` = γ
′
`v` + η`, (11)
where γ` is an 2M -vector which expresses the change of efficient price conditional on
innovations in dealer quotes, and η` is the part of the change in the efficient price
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that is orthogonal to v`. Contrary to the reduced form variance decomposition in
Hasbrouck (1995) the change in the efficient price is not a deterministic function of
the quote innovations. The structural model (1) leads to a remainder term η` in (11).
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Being regression parameters, γ` is defined as
γ` = Var(v`)
−1Cov(v`, ∆m`). (12)
For the variance in dealer quote innovations we find
Var(v`) = Σ` = σ
2
`β`β
′
` + Ω (13)
The covariance between the change in the efficient price and dealer quote innovations
follows directly from (8) as
Cov(v`, ∆m`) = σ
2
`β` (14)
To solve for γ`, note that the structure of Σ` is that of a full matrix Ω plus a symmetric
rank one correction σ2`β`β
′
`. We can guess a solution γ` = aΩ
−1β` and solve for a using
the equality Σ`γ` = σ
2
`β`, leading to
γ` =
σ2`
1 + σ2`β
′
`Ω
−1β`
Ω−1β`. (15)
As with β(τ) we can make the functional dependence on τ explicit through
γ(τ) =
σ2τ 2δ1Ω−1β(τ)
1 + σ2τ 2δ1β(τ)′Ω−1β(τ)
. (16)
Again the regression coefficients are a function of the duration τ`. Contrary to β(τ)
this second measure depends strongly on the idiosyncratic noise Ω−1. Assuming
all other factors constant, this measure increases for a particular dealer when the
corresponding elements in Ω−1 increase (i.e. the particular dealer has low idiosyncratic
noise) and vice versa.
The last price discovery measure is defined as the proportional contribution of
dealer quote innovations to the innovation in the efficient price and resembles the
Hasbrouck (1995) information shares. This measure is determined as the fraction of
the variance of the change in the efficient price that can be attributed to innovations
in the quote updates of a dealer. Taking the variance on both sides of (11) gives
σ2` = γ
′
`Σ`γ` + κ
2
` , (17)
2 De Jong and Schotman (2004) further explore the relations between the structural unobserved
components model and the reduced form vector error correction model.
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where κ2` is the variance of η` and is implicitly defined by (17). Since in general κ
2
` > 0
in (17), the R2 of regression (11) will not be equal to one.
From elementary linear regression analysis we can write the R2 of (11) as
R2` =
γ′`Σ`γ`
σ2`
= γ′`β` (18)
The last equality in (18) immediately suggests how to define the contributions to price
discovery of the individual dealers. Let βi,` = (β
b
i,` β
a
i,`)
′ and γi,` = (γbi,` γ
a
i,`)
′ be the
(2× 1) subvectors of β` and γ` that correspond to the bid and ask quotes of dealer i.
Then we define the information shares analogously to DeJong and Schotman (2004)
as
ISi,` = β
′
i,`γi,` =
(
σ2`
1 + σ2`β
′
`Ω
−1β`
)
β′i,`Ω
−1
i βi,`. (19)
Due to the block-diagonal structure of Ω we obtain a unique variance decomposition,
unlike in the reduced form vector error correction models of price discovery. The
information shares sum to R2` . For the interpretation of the information shares we
can expand the last part of (19) as
ISi,` =
φi,`
1 +
∑M
j=1 φj,`
, (20)
where
φi,` =
σ2`
1− ρ2i
((
βbi,`/ω
b
i
)2
+
(
βai,`/ω
a
i
)2 − 2ρi (βbi,`/ωbi ) (βai,`/ωai )) (21)
and
Ωi =
(
(ωbi )
2 ρiω
b
iω
a
i
ρiω
b
iω
a
i (ω
a
i )
2
)
The important element in the information shares are the ratios βpi,`/ω
p
i (p = a, b).
It divides the impact of the dealer quote with respect to the change in the efficient
price by the idiosyncratic noise of the dealer. Since all elements of β` depend on τ`,
the ordering of the information shares can differ depending on the duration towards
the most recent quote update. The expression for φi,` simplifies to the simple ratio
(σ`βi,`/ωi)
2 when we would just include either the bid, or ask or mid-quote in the
vector q`.
Looking back at (8), it should be noted that we consider the entire quote vector
q`, whereas only the sub-vector J`q` has been updated. Strictly speaking we should
therefore consider the relation between the innovation in J`q` and ∆m` in defining β`
and γ`. Since we do not have a model of who will be the next dealer to issue a quote,
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we do not have anything to say about predicting the selection matrix J` conditional
on J`−1 and q`−1. Proceeding conditional on J`, the innovation in J`q` will be equal
to J`v`. The only effect of this on the information measure β` is that we obtain the
sub-vector β˜` = J`β` instead of the full β`. In the reverse regression we likewise find
γ˜` =
σ2`
1 + σ2` β˜
′
`Ω˜
−1β˜`
Ω˜−1β˜`, (22)
with Ω˜` = J`ΩJ
′
`. Due to the block diagonal structure of Ω, and because most quote
updates involve both the bid and ask of the same dealer, this will in most cases be a
rescaled sub-vector of γ`.
So far all measures have a subscript ` to indicate that they are conditional on
the duration τ`. In this way the price discovery measures depend on the latest quote
arrival, and do not provide an overall picture of the price discovery process. As a
more relevant measure the next subsection will aggregate the information contents of
a series of quote arrivals.
3.2 Calendar Time Aggregation
In the previous section we discussed measures for price discovery of single quote
updates. In this section we define similar measures of price discovery over time. To
obtain these measures we aggregate the tick time measures to fixed time intervals.
Let us start by fixing some notation. In calendar time we refer to the present time
with the suffix (t), while we use the subscript ` to denote variables in tick time. To
establish the link between calendar time and tick time, let `(t) represent the closest
observation preceding to time t, so that q(t) = q`(t) and similarly q` = q(t`). Between
times t and t− 1 there are `(t)− `(t− 1) quote updates.
In calendar time innovations in dealer quotes are decomposed as
v(t) = q(t)− E[q(t)|m(t− 1), q(t− 1)] = ι∆m(t) + u`(t) (23)
with ∆m(t) = m(t)−m(t−1). The innovation in quotes is equal to the change in the
efficient price plus the noise around this efficient price observed at the last interval.
The change in the efficient price from `(t− 1) to `(t) is the sum of all the interjacent
changes. Only the most recent change is part of both ∆m(t) and u`(t). We can write
(23) as
v(t) = ι
`(t)−1∑
j=`(t−1)+1
σjrj + σ`(t)β`(t)r`(t) + e`(t). (24)
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From (24) we can compute the calendar price discovery measures β(t), γ(t) and IS(t).
Start by defining the moments
E[∆m(t)2] =
`(t)∑
j=`(t−1)+1
σ2j
E[v(t)∆m(t)] = ι(σ(t)2 − σ2`(t)) + σ2`(t)β`(t)
E[v(t)v(t)′] = (σ(t)2 − σ2`(t))ιι′ + σ2`(t)β`(t)β′`(t) + Ω
(25)
We will frequently use the shorthand notation
σ(t)2 = E[∆m(t)2],
σ˜(t)2 = σ(t)2 − σ2`(t),
Σ(t) = E[v(t)v(t)′].
(26)
The volatility σ(t) increases with the length of the interval and is a function of all
durations in this time interval. This immediate implies that the covariance matrix
Σ(t) converges to a matrix of rank one proportional to ιι′. This is simply a conse-
quence of cointegration with a single common trend. Over long enough intervals all
quote updates will be perfectly correlated.
Dealer liquidity β(t) is the response of innovations in the dealer quotes to a change
in the efficient price over the time interval. This is the regression coefficient of quote
innovations v(t) on the change in the efficient price ∆m(t). From (25) we find
β(t) =
E[v(t)∆m(t)]
E[∆m(t)2]
=
σ˜(t)2
σ(t)2
ι+
σ2`(t)
σ(t)2
β`(t), (27)
which is now a function of all the durations between t − 1 and t. Recalling the
definition of β` in (9), it is seen that β(t) is again linear in α. Elements of β(t) have
a lower bound of one when the corresponding element of α is positive and an upper
bound of one when it is negative.
Since σ(t)2 (and σ˜(t)2) increase with the length of the interval, the parameter β(t)
will converge to the unit vector ι when the calendar time interval increases. The rate
of convergence towards ι depends on the parameters δ1 and δ2. Thus when intervals
are larger, dealers incorporate information about the true price more efficiently into
their quotes and possible asymmetries in information that dealers have about the
innovation in the efficient price disappears. Over long enough time intervals, all
dealers will follow the movements of the underlying market price.
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For the price discovery measure γ(t) we again consider the reverse regression,
∆m(t) = γ(t)′v(t) + η(t) (28)
with has regression coefficients
γ(t) = Σ(t)−1β(t)σ(t)2 (29)
The derivation of γ(t) is slightly more involved than it was for the tick time equivalent
γ`, since Σ(t) is now a symmetric rank two correction on Ω. We guess a solution
γ(t) = cιΩ
−1ι+ cβΩ−1β`(t), (30)
with scalars cι and cβ for which we provide the explicit solution in appendix A. The
constants depend on all parameters of the model and all durations in period t.
Finally for the information shares in calendar time we consider the R2 of (28),
R2(t) = γ(t)′β(t) (31)
and decompose it in the information shares
ISi(t) = βi(t)
′γi(t)
= dιι
(
ι′2Ω
−1
i ι2
)
+ dιβ
(
ι′2Ω
−1
i βi,`(t)
)
+ dββ
(
β′i,`(t)Ω
−1
i βi,`(t)
)
, (32)
with ι2 a vector of 2 ones, and scalars dιι, dιβ and dββ that follow directly from
(27) and (30) and are given explicitly in appendix A. When the sampling interval
increases the change in dealer quotes will to a large extent represent the change in
the efficient price. As a consequence the R2 of the regression of the change in the
efficient price on dealer quote innovations converges to one. The convergence of R2 to
one together with the convergence of β(t) to ι, implies that both the elements of γ(t)
as well as the information shares ISi(t) will sum to one for large intervals. Details are
in appendix A. We therefore conclude that information shares are the only relevant
measure in calendar at sufficiently large intervals.
4 Data
We use data provided by Nastraq. The Nastraq data set contains all trades and quotes
that occur within normal trading hours at Nasdaq. The dealer quote data contains all
quotes issued within normal trading hours, time stamped to the nearest second. Most
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important, it contains the identity of the dealer that issues the quote. We select 20
actively traded companies with different liquidity listed at Nasdaq during February
1999. The selected stocks and their symbols are reported in table 1.
Our data are similar to the data used by Huang (2002). His data are from different
months in 1999. Contrasting to our approach, he creates categories of different types
of dealers. We prefer to consider quotes of individual dealers as quoting behavior
is heterogenous even within categories (see Schultz, 2003). Additionally, the model
developed in section 2 is more suited to describe individual quoting behavior. We
consider dealer quotes of the five largest dealers in terms of quoting frequency. This
leads to the selection of two ECNs, Island and Instinet, and three wholesale market
makers, which differ depending on the stock considered.
Since we are interested in modelling the innovations in dealer quotes, we remove
all quotes that do not change. For example, when dealer i innovates only her ask,
the corresponding bid quote is removed. When a dealer issues multiple quotes at
the same second, the last quote in this sequence is selected.3 Due to these selection
criteria the number of updated quotes is just the bid and/or ask of a single dealer in
more 80% of all cases.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
We also remove outliers before estimation. Outliers often occur when a dealer is
unwilling to trade. In this case she will issue a quote far away from the inside (best
quote in the market). This can happen on one side of the market when a dealer is
unwilling to take on more inventory. Also, ECNs are not obliged to make the market
on both sides of the market, and in some cases do not issue a quote on one particular
side of the market. In this case a zero-quote is reported by Nastraq. Although these
quotes send a strong signal to the other marker participants, this is something not
considered here as we focus on the issue of price discovery. We define a quote as an
outlier when it is more than $ 2 away from the average of the past 50 quotes.
In table 1 we also report some summary statistics of the data after filtering. Our
sample contains very actively traded stocks like Dell as well as less actively traded
stocks like Starbucks. Since so many quote updates are updates by a single dealer, it
will be difficult to estimate covariances between the idiosyncratic component of the
3 This occurs frequently in the case of Island ECN, where many small trades are matched within
Island itself. Every time such a transaction occurs, Island will send a new best standing quote to
Nasdaq, which in many cases merely reflects a change in the quote depth. A change in quote depth
is not considered and all quotes that reflect a change in depth are removed.
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noise of different dealers. Average quote durations are just the inverse of the total
number of observations. They range from three seconds for the most active stocks
to half a minute for the less active stocks. The variance in durations can also lead
to identification problems is the variance in durations. The statistics table 1 are
reassuring in this respect, since durations for all stocks are highly volatile and will
not to cause any identification problems for δ1 or δ2.
5 Results
In this section we provide the results of the model proposed in section 2. We start by
providing results for the duration parameter estimates of (7). Next we address the
measures of price discovery, first in tick time, then in calendar time.
5.1 Duration Effects
In table 2 we present the estimates of the duration parameters δ1 and δ2, including
their standard errors in parentheses. For δ1, which measures the effect of quote
durations on the innovation in the efficient price, the values of interest are δ1 =
1
2
,
in which case the price process is said to evolve in calendar time, and δ1 = 0, in
which case the process evolves in tick time. Results for δ1 show that we can reject
the hypothesis that the price process evolves in calendar time. In most cases δ1 is
either insignificantly different from zero, or significantly negative. These findings
provide evidence for a price process that evolves in tick time and confirms findings
of Ane´ and Geman (2000). The calendar time variance of the random walk process
therefore increases if many quote innovations occurred over a predefined period of
time. Negative values for δ1 can be explained by the fact the we consider the quote
process, which is not necessarily the process that drives the flow of information. If
the true information arrival process (e.g the transactions process) evolves faster than
the quoting process, then negative values for δ1 are expected.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
The parameter δ2 measures the duration dependence of the asymmetric informa-
tion component α. We find that in 17 cases δ2 is significantly negative, which entails
that long quote durations lead to less asymmetric information and short durations to
more. These results confirm findings of Easley and O’Hara (1992), who hypothesize
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that long durations convey no information. In our case we find that asymmetries
have decreased.
The combined results for δ1 and δ2 implicate that periods with short durations
are periods with higher (calendar time) volatility and more asymmetric information.
Consequently, volatile periods are periods where asymmetries are large and vice versa.
For financial markets, durations tend to be shorter near the open and close of the
market and longer in the middle of the trading day. Hence these are the periods when
volatility is higher and asymmetries are larger.
5.2 Price Discovery per Quote Innovation
In this section we present the results for the three price discovery measures in tick
time as proposed in section 3.1. As shown, these measures are functions of quote
durations and are therefore affected by the parameter estimates of δ1 and δ2. We
present detailed results for three representative stocks in the sample (Intel, CMGI and
Apple) and show results for all stocks at average durations. We start by presenting
the results for these three stocks to provide more insight into price discovery measures.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
Apart from being affected by quote durations, price discovery measures dependent
on the parameter estimates of α and Ω. To provide some insight into how these
parameters affect price discovery measures, we show these estimates for the three
selected stocks in figure 2. The top part of each graph displays the estimates for
α. An α significantly higher/lower than zero indicates that a dealer has more/less
exposure to the innovation in the efficient price than the average of all dealers and
affects the price discovery measures for this particular dealer. For α, estimates differ
substantially among dealers, with highest values for market maker 1, market maker
2 and market maker 1 for Intel, CMGI and Apple respectively. The bottom part
in each graph displays estimates for the elements in Ω. These elements measure
the amount of variance of a dealer quote innovation that is not attributable to the
efficient price process. A low idiosyncratic noise variance therefore indicates that this
particular dealer tracks the efficient price closely. Size of the idiosyncratic variance
differs substantially among dealers. For Intel and CMGI, the Island ECN has the
lowest idiosyncratic dealer noise. For Apple, market maker 2 has the lowest. There
are further quite substantial differences in size of Ω among the different stocks. In
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general, Intel has lower idiosyncratic noise than CMGI and Apple, indicating that
dealers track the efficient price more effectively for Intel.
The first measure for price discovery (β(τ)) measures the innovations in dealer
quotes that are due to a change in the efficient price. As detailed in section 3.1
this measure depends on the parameters δ1, δ2 for convergence. Differences in dealer
liquidity are fully attributable to differences in α.
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
In figure 3 we show β(τ) for the three selected stocks as a function of quote
duration. For all stocks β(τ) converges towards unity when quote durations are
longer, as δ2 < δ1. This is expected, because when quote durations are long, dealers
have time to learn about the information present in the efficient price. However,
for all stocks, convergence is still not achieved even when durations are as long as
one minute. This indicates that asymmetries are persistent among dealers. The
measure for dealer liquidity is most dispersed at short durations indicating the largest
asymmetry in information. Further, the dispersion is larger, the lower the activity of
the stock. Hence, asymmetric information is more pronounced in less active stocks.
For Intel we find that market maker 1 has the highest measure of dealer liquidity.
For CMGI and Apple, these are market maker 2 and market maker 1, respectively. As
noted, this “dominance” is completely attributable to the α of the particular dealers
as can be seen from figure 2.
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
The second measure for price discovery (γ(τ)) considers the reverse regression of
the efficient price change on dealer quote innovations. This measure examines the
effect of a single quote innovation on the change in the efficient price. Again this
measure depends on quote durations. As detailed in section 3.1, this measure is
highly dependent on the idiosyncratic dealer noise and is higher for dealers with low
entries in the idiosyncratic covariance matrix Ω and higher for dealer with higher
values for β(τ), or equivalently α.
In figure 4 we show γ(τ) for the three selected stocks. Generally, the dispersion
in γ(τ) is largest at short duration, where the dominating dealers also obtain their
highest value for price discovery. For Intel we observe a clear and persistent dominance
of the Island ECN at all durations, for Apple we observe this persistent dominance
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for market maker 2. These results are mainly driven by the low idiosyncratic noise
components for both dealers as shown in figure 2. In the case of CMGI, results are
mixed. At short very durations market maker 2 dominates at longer durations. The
dominance of market maker 2 at short durations is attributable to the high value of
β(τ) at short duration. At longer duration β(τ) decreases for market maker 2 and
the low idiosyncratic noise of Island dominates over this asymmetry effect.
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE
The third measure for price discovery (IS(τ)), referred to as the information share,
is determined by considering the R2 of the regression of the efficient price change on
the innovation in dealer quotes, which is the inner product of β(τ) and γ(τ). This
total R2 is decomposed to individual information shares using the imposed structure
on Ω. As it combines the measures β(τ) and γ(τ), the information share will be higher
when the idiosyncratic dealer noise is lower and β(τ) is higher. As it considers the
product of both these measures, the impact of β(τ) will be larger in the information
share than in the measure for price discovery.
In figure 5 we display the graphs for the three stocks. Similar to the other mea-
sures, information shares are also highest at short durations. For the individual stocks
we observe that Island is the dominating dealer for Intel and is followed by market
maker 1, giving the same results as for the γ(τ) measure. The dominance of Island is
again due to the low idiosyncratic variance. For CMGI we find the highest informa-
tion share for market maker 2, which can be attributed to the higher value of β(τ).
The Island ECN increases in importance at longer durations, which can be attributed
to the strong increase in γ(τ) at longer durations. For Apple market maker 1 dom-
inates, based on its relatively high measure for both β(τ) and γ(τ). However, the
information share decreases quickly at longer durations.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
The results presented above lead to several conclusions for price discovery in gen-
eral. First, we have seen that price discovery measures among dealers differ most at
short durations. Hence, most asymmetry in price discovery measures is observed at
short durations. Second, the dominating dealer achieves its highest information share
at short durations. As durations are shorter near the open and close of the market,
higher values for information shares are mainly observed during these periods. This
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suggests that the structural model proposed in section 2 captures at least some of the
intraday dynamics of information asymmetry. Third, parameter estimates for δ1 led
to the conclusion that calendar time volatility is higher over periods where durations
are short. Combining this result with the results for price discovery leads to the
conclusion that price discovery tends to be larger when market volatility is higher,
which confirms findings of Martens (1998).
To discuss the results for the other stocks in the sample we first report estimates
for α and Ω. In table 3 we present the estimates for the α parameters in (7). Although
these α’s are not that informative on their own, they do indicate large heterogeneity
among the different dealers. Apart from affecting price discovery measures, this
heterogeneity indicates that dealer should not be grouped into categories (as in Huang,
2002) as their characteristics are very different. Moreover, the results also show that
heterogeneity is present in the bid and ask quotes for many dealers. Interesting are
the large values for α for particular dealers (e.g. market maker 1 for Dell, and market
maker1 and 2 for Peoplesoft), which will affect the results for the price discovery
measures.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
Table 4 presents average estimates of bid and ask quotes of the idiosyncratic
dealer noise variance as estimated from (7). Averages are reported, as elements
in Ω do not differ substantially between bid and ask quote of a particular dealer.
Average variances do differ between dealers, indicating that quoting behavior differs
considerably between dealers. For most of the active stocks in the sample (Cisco, Dell,
Microsoft and Intel) we find that the Island ECN has the lowest idiosyncratic dealer
noise. For the less active stocks in the sample other dealer have lower variances (e.g.
Apple, Compuware and Starbucks). These results clearly have their implications for
γ(τ) and IS(τ), which we discuss later.
For all stocks, measures for price discovery in tick time are reported in table 5.
This table reports these measures at average durations. Panel A reports the measure
for dealer liquidity.4 Similar to the large differences in α we also find large differences
in measures for dealer liquidity. Especially for Peoplesoft and Dell extremely large
values for dealer liquidity are found.
4Recall that durations are scaled by dividing them by the average duration. At average durations
τ = 1 and therefore β(τ) = ι+ α.
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INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
Panel B reports the measure for price discovery at average durations. All values
are multiplied by 100 and can be interpreted as a the percentage of change in the
efficient price due to a change in a particular dealer quote (bid or ask). Generally
we find that the Island ECN has the highest price discovery measure for the most
active stocks in the sample (Cisco, Dell, Intel and Microsoft). Other interesting
findings are the zeros reported for the stocks of Amazon and Peoplesoft, where only
one dealer seems to matter for price discovery. Also interesting is the high price
discovery measure of market maker 1 for Starbucks. All these results are driven by
large negative covariances between idiosyncratic noise terms. For most stocks and
dealers we find small positive covariances, which is expected according to theories of
inventory models. We therefore do not add too much value to these results.
Panel C reports results for information shares, again reported at average durations
and multiplied by 100. These measures are reported per dealer and not per individual
quote, as for the other two measures. There are some interesting results found in this
panel. Generally, we find that information shares per quote innovation are quite low,
mostly around 5%. Specifically, we find that the Island ECN dominates for most of
the active stocks in the sample (Cisco, Intel and Microsoft). For less active stocks,
other dealers dominate.
The last column reports the total regression R2, or the sum of the information.
This number indicates how much of the variance of the efficient price is attributable
to quote changes of all dealers. Apart from the three stocks with huge information
shares (Amazon, Peoplesoft and Starbucks), on average 14.30% of the variance of the
efficient price can be explained by the quotes of the top five dealers.
5.3 Calendar Time Aggregation
In the previous part we discussed results for price discovery measures per quote up-
date. When these measures are aggregated they provide useful information on how
information is incorporated into prices over time and allow us to determine the total
price contribution of dealers. Another benefit of time aggregation is that the mea-
sure we find is comparable to traditional measures, like Hasbrouck (1995) information
shares. In this part we aggregate to one minute and five minute frequencies, as these
frequencies are most commonly used in other studies.
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In section 3.2 we showed how calendar time measures depend on σ(t)2, which
is a function of all durations that occur within the aggregation interval. Hence,
we compute these measures by considering the entire sample of observed durations.
Since each period t is the sum of a different set of durations τ` (` = `(t − 1) +
1, . . . , `(t)), we end up with distributions for each price discovery measure. We start
again by presenting price discovery measures for the three selected stocks in detail
and subsequently present summary results for all stocks.
INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE
In figure 6 we show the distributions of β(t) at 60 and 300 seconds (only the
distributions of the bid quotes are shown, ask quotes are similar). Depending on
the sign of α these measures are higher or lower than one. Recall that when the
time period over which we aggregate increases, this measure converges to one. This
convergence is clearly seen for all three stocks. For Intel, dealers incorporate most
of the information in the efficient price into their quotes at a 60 second aggregation
level. As it is the most active stock of the three selected ones, it has most quote
innovations occurring within an aggregation interval. Hence, convergence for Intel
occurs quickly. Next, for CMGI we observe that there is still quite some dispersion
in the liquidity measure at the 60 second aggregation level. At five minutes these
measures have converged. For Apple, measures for liquidity have not converged, even
at the five minute level. So even at five minute frequencies, dealers are not able to
incorporate all the information of the efficient price into their quotes.
INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE
Results for γ(t) are shown in the distribution plots in figure 7 (we show these
measures for ask quotes, bids are similar). For all stocks, we observe that γ(t) in-
creases when the aggregation interval increases. We also find that the distribution of
γ(t) narrows at the longer aggregation interval. In terms of dominance, we find that
Island unambiguously has the highest value for γ(t) for both Intel and CMGI. For
Apple results are less clear as distributions are very wide. Market maker 2, however,
tends to have the highest value for γ(t). These findings are in line with the measures
in tick time, where Island dominated price discovery for both Intel and CMGI and
market maker 2 dominated for Apple.
INSERT FIGURE 8 HERE
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Finally, in figure 8 we show the distribution of IS(t) per dealer for the three
selected stocks. These graphs show similar distributions as for γ(t), since . The
reason for this is that ISi(t) is defined as the inner product of βi(t) and γi(t). As
βi(t) converges to unity at longer aggregation intervals, ISi(t) approximately equals
the sum of γi(t) for bid and ask quote. For CMGI and Apple the calendar time
results for the information shares differ substantially from the tick time equivalents.
For CMGI we found that IS(τ) is highest for market maker 2 and for Apple IS(t) is
highest for market maker 1, which was mainly due to the large values for β(τ). For
IS(t), Island has the highest value for CMGI and market maker 2 for Apple. The
difference can again be attributed to the convergence of βi(t). Hence the information
shares in calendar time only depend on the idiosyncratic dealer noise.
INSERT FIGURE 9 HERE
In figure 9 we show the sum of the information shares (R2 of (28)) for one, two
and five minute aggregation intervals. When we move to longer sampling intervals
more information is incorporated in the efficient price of the stock. In the case of
Intel and CMGI, all information is almost fully incorporated after five minutes. In
the case of Apple we see that after five minutes there is still a substantial amount of
dealer noise.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
For all stocks in the sample we report results for price discovery measures in calen-
dar time in tables 6, 7 and 8. Reported results are at 60 and 300 second aggregation
levels and averages of the measures of price discovery are reported.
In table 6 we report results for β(t). These results again show the convergence to
unity. Most stocks have achieved this convergence after five minutes, like Intel, but
for the less liquid stocks this measure still has not converged (see e.g. QWST). Hence
for the less active stocks β(t) still affect γ(t) and IS(t).
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE
Table 7 reports average values for γ(t) at a one and five minute aggregation level.
Generally, price discovery measures increase when the sampling interval increases. At
both sampling intervals we see that Island has very high measures for price discovery
compared to the other dealers, especially for the more active stocks in the sample
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(Cisco, Dell, Intel, Microsoft). For the less active stocks, however, it is mostly a
market maker that dominates in price discovery (see Novell, Nextel, Peoplesoft, Qwest
and Starbucks). Instinet never dominates the information shares.
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE
Results for information shares per dealer are shown in table 8. Similar to γ(t)
information shares increase when the sampling interval increases, as more of the
variance of efficient price changes can be explained by dealer quote innovations. Again
we note that for most stocks, and for all the liquid stocks Island is dominant. For the
most liquid stocks, Cisco and Dell, 77% and 87% of the variance of the efficient price
change is explained by Island. For the less active stocks (e.g. Apple, Novell, Nextel,
Starbucks) information shares are dominated by other dealers.
The last column in table 8 reports the total R2 for each stock. There is a clear
increase in R2 when the aggregation interval increases. However, the total amount
of variance attributable to all dealers per stock differs. In general, R2 is higher for
the more active stocks (Cisco and Dell) and lower for the less active stocks (Novell).
These results have implications for e.g. realized volatility (see Andersen et al., 2001),
where microstructure noise is an important feature.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has introduced a model for dealer quoting behavior in tick time. Quote
innovations are modelled as they arrive using an unobserved components model. As
the model is defined in tick time, we additionally measure the effect of quote durations
on the volatility of the efficient price process and the effect of quote durations on
asymmetric information.
Given the model we define three measures for price discovery, one relating to
dealer liquidity, one to price discovery and one to information shares. Consequently,
these measures are aggregated to calendar time equivalents.
In our empirical results we find that more volatility is generated when durations
between quote innovations are short. We also find that there is more asymmetric
information in dealer quotes at short durations. Combining these two results leads
to the conclusion that there is more asymmetric information when volatility is high.
The measures for price discovery in tick time show that all three measures address
different features of the price discovery process. We find that in most cases the Island
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ECN dominates the price discovery measure (as it is mainly based in the idiosyncratic
dealer noise component), but other market maker dominate in terms of information
share (due to the asymmetric information component). In calendar time the most
relevant measure is the information share. For most active stocks we find that the
Island ECN dominates, for less active stocks a wholesale market maker dominates.
Finally, the sum of the information shares can be used as an indication of how
much microstructure noise remains in aggregated dealer quotes. It is also informative
about the speed of price discovery. This information can be used for studies on e.g.
realized volatility.
In developing our model we have remained close to the analysis of the quote setting
process of Huang (2002). Extension of the model can go in several directions.
First, a time of the day effect can be accommodated for in the model. For example
α parameters, which measure the asymmetric information can be redefined to depend
on the time of the day. Similarly, the innovation in the efficient price can depend on
the time of the day. Part of this time of the day effect is already captured by the
inclusion of the quote durations. As durations have an intradaily pattern, measures
for price discovery will also have an intradaily pattern.
Second, additional variables can be added to the model. For example, the volume
quoted by a particular dealer might be an indicator of the amount of asymmetric
information that a particular dealer may posses. Additionally, a quote innovation
that brings a particular dealer to the inside (the best quote in the market) may
contain more information than any other quote innovation (see Frijns and Schotman,
2004).
Third, in this paper we consider durations between quote innovations for the
asymmetric information component, as we are interested in seeing how asymmetric
information differs between active and tranquil periods. The model may be extended
by including dealer specific quote durations, where we can measure how the speed at
which a particular dealer quotes affects its asymmetric information, but also affects
the asymmetric information component of other dealers.
Fourth, adding transaction prices and a buy/sell indicator, as in Barclay, Hen-
dershott and McCormick (2003), enables a more precise estimation of the asymmet-
ric information component. Within the unobserved components model, transaction
prices are easily included even if they evolve at a different pace compared to quote
innovations.
25
A Calendar Time Price Discovery Measures
This appendix provides the derivation of γ(t) and ISi(t) in calendar time. We start
by repeating the definition of γ(t) in (29)
γ(t) = Σ(t)−1β(t)σ(t)2 (A1)
and the earlier derived moments
σ(t)2 =
`(t)∑
j=`(t−1)+1
σ2j
Σ(t) = σ˜(t)2ιι′ + σ2`(t)β`(t)β
′
`(t) + Ω
σ˜(t)2 = σ(t)2 − σ2`(t),
β(t) =
σ˜(t)2
σ(t)2
ι+
σ2`(t)
σ(t)2
β`(t),
(A2)
To simplify notation we will use the shorthand ` for `(t), when there can be no
confusion that we mean the last quote update of period t, from time t − 1 to t. As
another useful shorthand notation we define the (2× 2) matrix
V =
(
Vιι Vιβ
Vιβ Vββ
)
=
(
ι′Ω−1ι ι′Ω−1β`
ι′Ω−1β` β′`Ω
−1β`
)
(A3)
Except Vιι the elements of V depend on the duration τ`(t).
To solve for γ(t) we guess the solution
γ(t) = cιΩ
−1ι+ cβΩ−1β` (A4)
and substitute in
Σ(t)γ(t) = σ(t)2β(t) (A5)
to obtain(
σ˜(t)2ιι′ + σ2`β`β
′
` + Ω
) (
cιΩ
−1ι+ cβΩ−1β`
)
= σ(t)2
(
σ˜(t)2
σ(t)2
ι+
σ2`(t)
σ(t)2
β`
)
m (A6)
cι
(
σ˜(t)2Vιι + 1
)
ι+ cισ
2
`Vιββ` + cβσ˜(t)
2Vιβι+ cβ
(
σ2`Vββ + 1
)
β` = σ(t)
2ι+ σ2`β`
Equating coefficients on ι and β` to determine the constants cι and cβ gives a system
of 2 linear equations in two unknowns(
σ˜(t)2Vιι + 1 σ˜(t)
2Vιβ
σ2`Vιβ σ
2
`Vββ + 1
)(
cι
cβ
)
=
(
σ˜(t)2
σ2`
)
(A7)
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with solution (
cι
cβ
)
=
1
D
(
Vββ − Vιβ + 1/σ2`
Vιι − Vιβ + 1/σ˜(t)2
)
(A8)
in which
D =
(
Vιι + 1/σ˜(t)
2
) (
Vββ + 1/σ
2
`
)− V 2ιβ (A9)
Of particular interest are the expressions for γ(t) for small and large time intervals.
First, if the interval is reduced to a single quote update, (A8) reduces to the tick time
solution (15) with cι = 0 and cβ = 1/(Vββ + 1/σ
2
` ),
lim
σ˜(t)2→0
γ(t) = γ` =
σ2`
1 + σ2`Vββ
β` (A10)
Second, for a very large interval, we take the limit as σ˜(t)2 →∞,
γ¯ = lim
σ˜(t)2→∞
γ(t) =
(Vββ − Vιβ + 1/σ2` ) Ω−1ι+ (Vιι − Vιβ) Ω−1β`
Vιι (Vββ + 1/σ2` )− V 2ιβ
(A11)
Premultiplying γ¯ by ι′ and using the definitions of Vιβ and Vββ establishes that the
elements of γ¯ sum to one. To gain more insight in γ¯ we go back to the original
parameterization with α`. Recalling (9),
β` = ι+
α`
σ`
, (A12)
we have
γ¯ =
(Vββ − 2Vιβ + Vιι + 1/σ2` ) Ω−1ι+ (Vιι − Vιβ) Ω−1α`/σ`
Vιι (Vββ + 1/σ2` )− V 2ιβ
(A13)
Also expressing Vιβ and Vββ in terms of α` gives
Vιι − Vιβ = ι′Ω−1ι− ι′Ω−1β`
= −ι′Ω−1α`/σ` = −Vια/σ`
Vββ − 2Vιβ + Vιι = β′`Ω−1β` − 2ι′Ω−1β` + ι′Ω−1ι
= α′`Ω
−1α`/σ` = Vαα/σ2`
VιιVββ − V 2ιβ = Vιι (ι+ α`/σ`)′Ω−1 (ι+ α`/σ`)− (Vιι + Vια/σ`)2
=
1
σ2`
(
VιιVαα − V 2ια
)
(A14)
Substituting all coefficients of (A14) in (A13) we finally obtain
γ¯ =
(1 + Vαα)Ω
−1ι− VιαΩ−1α`
Vιι + VιιVαα − V 2ια
(A15)
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The limiting value γ¯ does not depend on σ or δ1, meaning that the price discovery
parameters are independent of the process of the efficient price. Since α` depends on
τ` and δ2, the limiting information shares still depend on the most recent duration.
For the information shares we need the (2 × 1) sub-vectors βi(t) and γi(t) corre-
sponding to the bid and ask quotes of dealer i. Combining (A2), (A4), (A8) and (A9)
we get
ISi(t) = γi(t)
′βi(t)
=
(
cιΩ
−1ι2 + cβΩ−1βi,`
)′( σ˜(t)2
σ(t)2
ι2 +
σ2`
σ(t)2
βi,`
)
= dιι
(
ι′2Ω
−1
i ι2
)
+ dιβ
(
ι′2Ω
−1
i βi,`
)
+ dββ
(
β′i,`Ω
−1
i βi,`
)
, (A16)
with
dιι = cι
σ˜(t)2
σ(t)2
dιβ = cι
σ2`
σ(t)2
+ cβ
σ˜(t)2
σ(t)2
dββ = cβ
σ2`
σ(t)2
(A17)
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table lists the twenty Nasdaq stocks included in the sample. The number of quote updates
is the total number of times a dealer either changes a bid or an ask. The number of single
quotes is the frequency of observations for which only one dealer issues a new quote. The last
two columns provide the average and standard deviation of the durations between quote updates.
# quote % single Average Std. dev.
Symbol Company name updates quotes duration duration
AAPL Apple Computer Inc. 29,787 89.63 15.71 28.73
AMAT Applied Materials Inc. 105,090 83.58 4.77 5.95
AMGN Amgen Inc. 40,279 83.97 12.32 22.24
AMZN Amazon.com, Inc. 150,710 80.52 3.44 4.39
ATHM At Home Corporation 76,435 86.50 6.34 9.40
CMGI CMGI, Inc. 90,401 87.06 5.34 7.75
COMS 3Com Corporation 61,049 89.56 7.68 11.34
CPWR Compuware Corporation 33,301 90.55 13.92 31.03
CSCO Cisco Systems Inc. 164,480 80.85 3.13 3.52
DELL Dell Computer Corporation 177,850 77.39 3.02 3.44
INTC Intel Corporation 171,260 76.92 3.15 3.56
MSFT Microsoft Corporation 151,110 80.82 3.42 3.94
NOVL Novell Inc. 18,909 87.88 25.08 43.93
NXTL Nextel Communications CL-A 19,556 91.63 23.42 42.23
ORCL Oracle Corporation 87,774 85.81 5.56 7.46
PSFT Peoplesoft Inc. 24,601 91.12 18.74 32.02
QWST Qwest Communications Intl Inc. 44,459 88.33 10.68 18.12
SBUX Starbucks Corporation 14,320 90.06 32.43 64.92
SUNW Sun Microsystems Inc. 128,370 82.43 4.20 5.15
WCOM MCI WorldCom Inc. 88,550 83.33 5.66 7.41
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Table 2: Duration Parameters
This table presents the estimates for the duration parameters δ1 and δ2 in (7). Standard
errors are in parentheses. Stocks are referred to by the ticker symbols explained in table 1.
δ1 measures the impact of time on the innovation in the efficient price process and has
values of interest of δ1 = 12 , which represents a process that evolves in calendar time and
δ1 = 0, which represents a process that evolves in tick time.
Stock δ1 δ2 Symbol δ1 δ2
AAPL -0.06 (0.03) -0.44 (0.05) INTC -0.17 (0.02) -0.23 (0.04)
AMAT 0.02 (0.02) -1.20 (0.17) MSFT -0.20 (0.02) -0.13 (0.03)
AMGN 0.04 (0.02) -0.21 (0.17) NOVL -0.23 (0.04) -0.59 (0.05)
AMZN 0.03 (0.01) 0.50 (0.02) NXTL -0.05 (0.03) -0.44 (0.08)
ATHM 0.01 (0.02) -1.26 (0.18) ORCL 0.02 (0.02) -0.82 (0.05)
CMGI 0.07 (0.01) -0.11 (0.04) PSFT 0.00 (0.02) -0.23 (0.03)
COMS -0.11 (0.02) -0.51 (0.06) QWST -0.14 (0.02) 0.23 (0.03)
CPWR 0.00 (0.02) -0.72 (0.13) SBUX -0.01 (0.03) -0.32 (0.06)
CSCO -0.07 (0.01) -0.24 (0.04) SUNW -0.06 (0.02) -0.96 (0.11)
DELL -0.13 (0.01) -0.30 (0.03) WCOM -0.11 (0.02) -1.17 (0.14)
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Table 3: Quote Specific Relations to the Efficient Price
This table presents the estimates for the vector α in (7). Standard errors are in parentheses. Stocks
are referred to by the ticker symbols explained in table 1. Dealers include the ECN’s Island (ISLD)
and Instinet (INCA) plus the three most active individual wholesale dealers. Parameters differ for
bid and ask quotes.
ISLD INCA MM1 MM2 MM3
Stock bid ask bid ask bid ask bid ask bid ask
AAPL -1.02 -0.56 1.24 0.58 3.17 2.01 0.98 -1.49 -0.82 -0.21
(0.20) (0.21) (0.37) (0.26) (0.40) (0.35) (0.19) (0.25) (0.36) (0.28)
AMAT -0.03 -0.06 0.07 0.38 0.49 0.33 -0.08 -0.12 0.02 -0.63
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.05) (0.06) (0.14) (0.19)
AMGN -1.59 -0.69 0.13 0.14 -1.44 -0.97 -1.70 -1.70 0.17 -0.13
(0.43) (0.42) (0.20) (0.28) (0.69) (0.60) (0.93) (1.09) (0.41) (0.43)
AMZN 0.00 0.12 0.93 1.38 -0.33 -0.66 -0.97 -5.21 -0.12 -0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.20) (0.18)
ATHM -0.08 -0.11 0.08 0.04 0.38 0.28 -0.15 -0.16 -0.13 -0.17
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.13) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
CMGI -0.35 -0.61 0.35 0.44 -0.39 -0.11 1.68 1.39 -1.03 -1.46
(0.08) (0.09) (0.15) (0.18) (0.17) (0.19) (0.15) (0.15) (0.21) (0.23)
COMS -0.07 -0.02 1.27 0.79 -1.21 -1.02 0.00 -0.24 0.00 1.49
(0.08) (0.07) (0.17) (0.18) (0.28) (0.30) (0.14) (0.22) (0.17) (0.28)
CPWR -0.22 -0.31 -0.12 0.04 0.59 0.37 0.79 0.89 0.12 -0.26
(0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.21) (0.19) (0.32) (0.36) (0.18) (0.18)
CSCO -0.41 -0.42 0.44 0.48 0.55 0.03 0.76 0.80 -3.00 -2.92
(0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.18) (0.25) (0.20) (0.25) (0.22) (0.23)
DELL -0.47 -0.47 0.12 0.26 4.54 5.34 0.01 0.60 -2.39 -2.84
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.34) (0.37) (0.12) (0.16) (0.11) (0.18)
INTC 0.00 -0.35 -0.28 -0.03 0.67 1.04 -1.39 -1.01 -1.39 -1.55
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.15) (0.16) (0.10) (0.11) (0.20) (0.19)
MSFT -0.07 -0.07 -0.10 0.05 -0.81 -0.18 -1.31 -1.22 -2.80 -2.73
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.19) (0.23) (0.12) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18)
NOVL 1.16 -0.07 1.69 0.16 1.73 -2.58 0.30 1.00 0.15 -0.07
(0.32) (0.12) (0.28) (0.11) (0.32) (0.44) (0.15) (0.20) (0.16) (0.16)
NXTL -1.44 -1.25 -0.49 -0.01 1.89 1.23 1.51 -1.32 0.16 -1.50
(0.39) (0.42) (0.23) (0.34) (0.45) (0.42) (0.48) (0.62) (0.20) (0.38)
ORCL -0.34 -0.46 0.20 -0.04 2.62 -2.15 -0.27 -0.05 -0.42 -0.26
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.22) (0.18) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.15)
PSFT 0.93 -0.43 1.90 0.18 11.98 9.51 8.09 9.20 -0.24 2.33
(0.36) (0.21) (0.30) (0.26) (1.44) (1.28) (1.03) (1.14) (0.54) (0.56)
QWST 0.99 0.22 4.57 5.46 -0.45 0.23 2.79 3.44 0.70 0.37
(0.69) (0.43) (0.47) (0.42) (0.42) (0.63) (0.71) (1.11) (0.19) (0.21)
SBUX 0.14 -0.08 1.21 0.22 1.87 1.28 -0.52 -1.10 -0.27 -0.16
(0.19) (0.32) (0.34) (0.23) (0.41) (0.31) (0.34) (0.43) (0.24) (0.19)
SUNW -0.08 -0.31 -0.04 0.00 -0.55 -0.50 -1.07 -1.61 0.10 0.10
(0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.14) (0.19) (0.27) (0.11) (0.13)
WCOM -0.02 -0.12 0.24 -0.13 0.65 0.49 -0.26 -0.36 0.17 -0.05
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.17) (0.15) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06)
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Table 4: Average Variance of the Idiosyncratic Dealer Noise Components
This table presents average variances (average over bid and ask quote)
of the idiosyncratic dealer noise components as estimated in (7). Stocks
are referred to as detailed in table 1. Dealers include the ECN’s Island
(ISLD) and Instinet (INCA) plus the three most active individual whole-
sale dealers. Parameters differ among dealer, but not for bid and ask
quotes (not reported).
Stock ISLD INCA MM1 MM2 MM3
AAPL 0.47 0.75 0.47 0.33 0.51
AMAT 0.09 0.34 0.29 0.30 0.58
AMGN 0.14 0.41 0.22 0.29 0.22
AMZN 0.03 0.32 0.34 0.10 0.52
ATHM 0.17 0.45 0.38 0.51 0.66
CMGI 0.10 0.50 0.43 0.39 0.62
COMS 0.14 0.42 0.50 0.49 0.38
CPWR 0.67 0.61 0.43 0.61 0.78
CSCO 0.01 0.15 0.25 0.39 0.18
DELL 0.01 0.15 0.47 0.43 0.18
INTC 0.03 0.12 0.19 0.10 0.22
MSFT 0.02 0.09 0.17 0.11 0.10
NOVL 1.03 0.95 0.83 0.63 0.56
NXTL 1.80 0.57 0.69 0.65 0.39
ORCL 0.12 0.37 0.43 0.26 0.28
PSFT 0.41 0.62 1.24 1.38 0.77
QWST 0.61 0.56 0.45 0.60 0.18
SBUX 1.09 0.54 0.25 0.66 0.33
SUNW 0.08 0.21 0.30 0.28 0.33
WCOM 0.10 0.16 0.27 0.15 0.29
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Table 5: Dealer Liquidity in Tick Time Measured at Average Duration
This table presents measures for price discovery in tick time for average durations. Stocks
are referred to as detailed in table 1. Included dealers are the ECN’s Island (ISLD)and
Instinet (INCA) and the three most active individual wholesale dealers. Panel A presents
the results for the measure of dealer liquidity (β(τ)), Panel B for price discovery (γ(τ))
and Panel C for information shares (IS(τ)). The results in Panel B and C are multiplied
by 100.
ISLD INCA MM1 MM2 MM3
Stock bid ask bid ask bid ask bid ask bid ask
Panel A: Dealer Liquidity β(τ) at average duration
AAPL -0.02 0.44 2.24 1.59 4.17 3.01 1.98 -0.49 0.18 0.79
AMAT 0.97 0.94 1.07 1.38 1.49 1.33 0.92 0.88 1.02 0.37
AMGN -0.59 0.31 1.13 1.14 -0.44 0.03 -0.70 -0.70 1.17 0.87
AMZN 1.00 1.12 1.93 2.38 0.67 0.34 0.03 -4.21 0.88 0.95
ATHM 0.92 0.89 1.08 1.04 1.38 1.28 0.85 0.84 0.87 0.83
CMGI 0.65 0.39 1.35 1.44 0.61 0.89 2.68 2.39 -0.03 -0.46
COMS 0.93 0.98 2.27 1.79 -0.21 -0.02 1.00 0.76 1.00 2.49
CPWR 0.78 0.69 0.88 1.04 1.59 1.37 1.79 1.89 1.12 0.74
CSCO 0.59 0.58 1.44 1.48 1.55 1.04 1.76 1.80 -2.00 -1.92
DELL 0.53 0.53 1.12 1.26 5.54 6.34 1.01 1.60 -1.39 -1.84
INTC 1.00 0.65 0.72 0.97 1.67 2.04 -0.39 -0.01 -0.39 -0.55
MSFT 0.93 1.07 0.90 1.05 0.19 0.82 -0.31 -0.22 -1.81 -1.73
NOVL 2.16 0.93 2.69 1.16 2.73 -1.58 1.30 2.00 1.15 0.93
NXTL -0.44 -0.25 0.51 0.99 2.89 2.23 2.51 -0.32 1.16 -0.50
ORCL 0.66 0.54 1.20 0.96 3.62 -1.15 0.73 0.95 0.58 0.74
PSFT 1.93 0.57 2.90 1.18 12.98 10.51 9.10 10.20 0.76 3.33
QWST 1.99 1.22 5.57 6.46 0.55 1.23 3.79 4.45 1.70 1.37
SBUX 1.14 0.92 2.21 1.22 2.87 2.28 0.48 -0.10 0.73 0.84
SUNW 0.92 0.69 0.96 1.00 0.45 0.50 -0.07 -0.61 1.10 1.10
WCOM 0.98 0.88 1.24 0.87 1.66 1.49 0.74 0.64 1.17 0.95
Panel B: Price Discovery γ(τ) at average duration (×100)
AAPL -0.03 0.24 0.81 0.59 2.22 0.64 1.96 -0.43 -0.07 0.50
AMAT 2.31 3.59 0.70 0.86 1.27 1.11 0.50 0.51 0.34 0.14
AMGN -1.16 0.56 0.65 0.54 -0.51 -0.09 -0.60 -0.46 1.21 0.59
AMZN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -17.85 -23.86 0.00 0.00
ATHM 2.45 2.28 0.76 0.80 1.57 1.35 0.68 0.66 0.41 0.44
CMGI 3.87 2.32 1.25 1.27 0.68 1.02 4.24 3.84 0.11 -0.40
COMS 1.89 1.75 1.57 0.90 -0.11 -0.01 0.60 0.37 0.66 1.46
CPWR 0.44 0.45 0.49 0.73 2.43 1.92 1.33 1.45 0.59 0.25
CSCO 3.65 3.79 0.62 0.65 0.46 0.28 0.32 0.31 -1.14 -0.74
DELL 5.23 6.42 0.39 0.55 0.68 0.90 0.13 0.20 -0.73 -0.57
INTC 1.58 1.55 0.32 0.45 0.53 0.65 -0.28 -0.01 -0.06 -0.14
MSFT 1.96 2.02 0.33 0.40 0.04 0.17 -0.13 -0.07 -0.57 -0.52
NOVL 0.73 0.31 0.97 0.47 1.79 -1.24 1.32 1.63 0.64 0.75
NXTL -0.12 -0.03 0.45 0.64 1.98 1.49 1.75 -0.62 1.59 -0.68
ORCL 1.25 1.04 0.67 0.50 2.01 -0.83 0.71 0.81 0.27 0.62
PSFT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.05 4.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
QWST 0.46 0.43 1.45 2.12 0.23 0.45 1.06 1.07 1.48 1.16
SBUX 0.06 0.03 0.20 0.07 18.23 16.92 0.03 -0.01 0.08 0.10
SUNW 1.35 1.29 0.57 0.59 0.22 0.17 -0.07 -0.28 0.41 0.33
WCOM 0.82 0.97 0.63 0.47 0.50 0.46 0.41 0.32 0.27 0.20
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Table 5 (Continued)
Panel C: Information Shares IS(τ) at average duration (×100)
Stock ISLD INCA MM1 MM2 MM3 R2
AAPL 0.10 2.75 11.21 4.11 0.38 18.55
AMAT 5.61 1.93 3.38 0.90 0.39 12.21
AMGN 0.86 1.36 0.22 0.74 1.94 5.12
AMZN 0.01 0.00 0.00 99.98 0.00 99.99
ATHM 4.27 1.65 3.89 1.13 0.73 11.67
CMGI 3.42 3.51 1.32 20.55 0.18 28.98
COMS 3.47 5.17 0.02 0.89 4.29 13.84
CPWR 0.65 1.20 6.50 5.11 0.84 14.30
CSCO 4.34 1.86 1.00 1.12 3.70 12.02
DELL 6.22 1.13 9.50 0.44 2.07 19.36
INTC 2.58 0.66 2.21 0.11 0.10 5.66
MSFT 3.99 0.71 0.15 0.06 1.92 6.38
NOVL 1.87 3.16 6.85 4.97 1.44 18.29
NXTL 0.06 0.86 9.06 4.61 2.19 16.78
ORCL 1.39 1.29 8.24 1.29 0.62 12.83
PSFT 0.00 0.00 99.92 0.03 0.00 99.95
QWST 1.43 21.72 0.68 8.80 4.11 36.74
SBUX 0.10 0.53 90.85 0.02 0.14 91.64
SUNW 2.13 1.15 0.18 0.18 0.82 4.46
WCOM 1.66 1.20 1.51 0.51 0.51 5.39
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Table 6: Average Values for Dealer Liquidity (β(t))
This table presents averages for dealer liquidity (β(t)) per dealer quote. This measure is defined in
(27). Stocks are referred to by the ticker symbols explained in table 1. Panel A shows this measure
aggregated to 60 seconds, panel B to 300 seconds. When the aggregation interval increases, all
measures converge to one.
ISLD INCA MM1 MM2 MM3
Stock bid ask bid ask bid ask bid ask bid ask
Panel A: 60 Second Intervals
AAPL 0.89 0.94 1.13 1.06 1.34 1.22 1.11 0.84 0.91 0.98
AMAT 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99
AMGN 0.81 0.92 1.02 1.02 0.83 0.89 0.80 0.80 1.02 0.98
AMZN 1.00 1.02 1.14 1.21 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.22 0.98 0.99
ATHM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
CMGI 0.98 0.96 1.02 1.03 0.97 0.99 1.12 1.10 0.93 0.90
COMS 1.00 1.00 1.08 1.05 0.92 0.94 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.10
CPWR 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.03 1.02 1.04 1.04 1.01 0.99
CSCO 0.98 0.98 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.00 1.03 1.03 0.87 0.87
DELL 0.98 0.98 1.01 1.01 1.19 1.23 1.00 1.03 0.90 0.88
INTC 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.03 1.05 0.93 0.95 0.93 0.93
MSFT 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.95 0.99 0.92 0.93 0.83 0.84
NOVL 1.17 0.99 1.25 1.02 1.26 0.62 1.04 1.15 1.02 0.99
NXTL 0.82 0.84 0.94 1.00 1.24 1.16 1.19 0.83 1.02 0.81
ORCL 0.99 0.99 1.01 1.00 1.07 0.94 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99
PSFT 1.16 0.93 1.33 1.03 3.05 2.63 2.39 2.58 0.96 1.40
QWST 1.52 1.11 3.39 3.85 0.76 1.12 2.46 2.80 1.37 1.19
SBUX 1.02 0.99 1.21 1.04 1.33 1.23 0.91 0.80 0.95 0.97
SUNW 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.96 1.00 1.00
WCOM 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.02 1.01 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
Panel B: 300 Second Intervals
AAPL 0.97 0.99 1.03 1.02 1.08 1.05 1.03 0.96 0.98 0.99
AMAT 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
AMGN 0.96 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.95 1.00 1.00
AMZN 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.05 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.81 1.00 1.00
ATHM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
CMGI 0.99 0.99 1.01 1.01 0.99 1.00 1.03 1.02 0.98 0.98
COMS 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.01 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.02
CPWR 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00
CSCO 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 0.97 0.97
DELL 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.04 1.05 1.00 1.01 0.98 0.98
INTC 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
MSFT 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.97
NOVL 1.04 1.00 1.06 1.01 1.07 0.90 1.01 1.04 1.01 1.00
NXTL 0.96 0.96 0.98 1.00 1.06 1.04 1.05 0.96 1.01 0.95
ORCL 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.02 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
PSFT 1.04 0.98 1.08 1.01 1.47 1.38 1.32 1.36 0.99 1.09
QWST 1.12 1.03 1.54 1.65 0.95 1.03 1.33 1.41 1.08 1.04
SBUX 1.01 1.00 1.06 1.01 1.10 1.07 0.97 0.94 0.99 0.99
SUNW 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
WCOM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
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Table 7: Average values for price discovery (γ(t))
This table presents averages for price discovery (γ(t)) per dealer quote. This measure is defined in
(30). Stocks are referred to by the ticker symbols explained in table 1. Panel A shows this measure
aggregated to 60 seconds, panel B to 300 seconds. When the aggregation interval increases, all
measures add up to one.
ISLD INCA MM1 MM2 MM3
Stock bid ask bid ask bid ask bid ask bid ask
Panel A: 60 Second Intervals
AAPL 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02
AMAT 0.14 0.22 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
AMGN 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.04
AMZN 0.30 0.38 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.01
ATHM 0.13 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03
CMGI 0.24 0.21 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.02
COMS 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03
CPWR 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02
CSCO 0.30 0.32 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
DELL 0.34 0.41 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
INTC 0.12 0.18 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.02
MSFT 0.16 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
NOVL 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
NXTL 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02
ORCL 0.12 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.05
PSFT 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01
QWST 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.05
SBUX 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
SUNW 0.11 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02
WCOM 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02
Panel B: 300 Second Intervals
AAPL 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.04
AMAT 0.19 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.03
AMGN 0.12 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.06
AMZN 0.32 0.41 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.01
ATHM 0.20 0.19 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.04
CMGI 0.29 0.25 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.03
COMS 0.17 0.15 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05
CPWR 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04
CSCO 0.37 0.40 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02
DELL 0.39 0.48 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01
INTC 0.19 0.28 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.02
MSFT 0.26 0.24 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03
NOVL 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04
NXTL 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.06
ORCL 0.18 0.18 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.07
PSFT 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.03
QWST 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.11
SBUX 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.41 0.38 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
SUNW 0.17 0.21 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04
WCOM 0.11 0.14 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.03
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Table 8: Averages for Information shares per dealer
This table presents Average results for information shares. This measure is obtained as
the inner product of β(t) and γ(t).The first five columns present the information shares
per dealer ISi(t), the last column reports the sum of the information shares (R2). Stocks
are referred to by the ticker symbols explained in table 1. Panel A presents the measure
aggregated to 60 seconds and panel B to 300 seconds. When the aggregation interval
increases, The sum of all information shares goes to one.
Stock Island Instinet MM1 MM2 MM3 R2
Panel A: 60 Second Intervals
AAPL 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.20
AMAT 0.35 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.62
AMGN 0.13 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.41
AMZN 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
ATHM 0.26 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.57
CMGI 0.46 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.80
COMS 0.17 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.38
CPWR 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.35
CSCO 0.61 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.75
DELL 0.74 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.82
INTC 0.29 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.53
MSFT 0.28 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.45
NOVL 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.12
NXTL 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.18
ORCL 0.23 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.08 0.54
PSFT 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.98
QWST 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.22
SBUX 0.00 0.01 0.74 0.01 0.01 0.77
SUNW 0.23 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.49
WCOM 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.33
Panel B: 300 Second intervals
AAPL 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.16 0.08 0.49
AMAT 0.50 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.06 0.89
AMGN 0.22 0.08 0.20 0.11 0.12 0.73
AMZN 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
ATHM 0.39 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.07 0.85
CMGI 0.55 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.06 0.96
COMS 0.32 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.71
CPWR 0.10 0.10 0.24 0.12 0.07 0.63
CSCO 0.77 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.93
DELL 0.87 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.95
INTC 0.46 0.11 0.07 0.15 0.05 0.84
MSFT 0.49 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.80
NOVL 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.25
NXTL 0.03 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.14 0.45
ORCL 0.36 0.10 0.08 0.17 0.12 0.83
PSFT 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
QWST 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.21 0.50
SBUX 0.01 0.01 0.88 0.01 0.01 0.92
SUNW 0.39 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.82
WCOM 0.25 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.06 0.67
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Figure 2: Parameter Estimates for Three Selected Stock
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Note: These graphs show parameter estimates for asymmetric information (α) and idiosyncratic
dealer noise (Ω) for three stocks, Intel, CMGI and Apple. The top part of each graphs shows α, the
bottom part Ω.
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Figure 3: Tick time measure for dealer liquidity (β(τ)) as a function of duration
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Note: These graphs show the dealer liquidity measures in tick time for INTC, CMGI and AAPL.
These measures are plotted as a function of duration.
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Figure 4: Tick time measure for price discovery (γ(τ)) as a function of duration
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Note: These graphs show the price discovery measures in tick time for INTC, CMGI and AAPL.
These measures are plotted as a function of duration.
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Figure 5: Tick time measure for Information Shares as a function of duration
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Note: These graphs show information shares in tick time for INTC, CMGI and AAPL per dealer.
These measures are plotted as a function of duration.
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Figure 6: Dealer liquidity in Calendar time
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Note: These graphs show the distributions of the calendar time measures for dealer liquidity. These
distributions are shown for the bids of INTC, CMGI and AAPL. Island is not shown as its value is
always 1. The aggregates are shown at 60 and 300 second intervals.
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Figure 7: Price Discovery in Calendar time
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Note: These graphs show the distributions of the calendar time measures for price discovery. These
distributions are shown for the asks of INTC, CMGI and AAPL. The aggregates are shown at 60
and 300 second intervals.
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Figure 8: Information Shares in Calendar time per dealer
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Note: These graphs show the distributions of the calendar time measures for Information Shares.
These distributions are shown for INTC, CMGI and AAPL. The aggregates are shown at 60 and
300 second intervals. This measure is obtained by taking the inner product of the measure for dealer
efficiency and price discovery. Using the specific structure of the model and by applying the matrix
inversion lemma, the inner product can be decomposed to dealers.
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Figure 9: Calendar time aggregated Information
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Note: These graphs show the distributions of the total information incorporated in dealer quotes over
a specific time interval. These distributions are shown for INTC, CMGI and AAPL. The aggregates
are shown at 60, 120 and 300 second intervals.
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